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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MUD CONTROL LAB ORATORIES,
INC., A Corporation,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

8025

THERON S. COVEY, et al,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The plaintiff and appellant in this action is an
Oklahoma corporation engaged in the business of
selling certain chemicals and materials generally
referred to in the oil well drilling trade as "drilling
mud." These chemicals and materials are mixed
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with wat<·r at the drill site and forced into the drill
hok through the drill pipe. They seal off the formation walls and carry the drill cuttings up from the
bot torn of the hole (R 110 & 111). The use and control of this mud and its chemical consistence is a
specializ<'d occupation.
The defendants and respondents are one M. E.
Baird and a group of people referred to in the course
of the trial of this case and in this brief as "the
Coveys." They, and some other people not involved
in this appeal, were co-owners of a leasehold on
which the Bertie Slaugh No. 1 well was drilled (R
238).
On January 5th, 1949, the Coveys made an
agreement which they denominated "Joint Operating
Agreement" with M. E. Baird and H. L. Robbins, a
partnership, for the purpose of getting the drilling of
the Bertie Slaugh No.1 well under way, and the well
was drilled pursuant thereto (R239). It was a dry hole.
The trial court found the Coveys to have been mining
partners of Baird and Robbins in this venture and,
as such, jointly responsible for the unpaid expenses of
drilling said oil well. Since the facts relative to that
proposition are not within the scope of this appeal,
no further detail will be indulged in in that regard.
They are the subject of the Cross-Appeal of the Coveys
on file herein.
Between March 7, 1949, and July 27, 1949, Mud
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Control Laboratories, Inc., sold and delivered to M.
E. Baird and H. L. Robbins drilling chemicals and
mud of the fair and reasonable value of $7,458.10,
and between July 27, 1949 and July 29, 1949, sold
and delivered further drilling chemicals and mud of
a fair and reasonable value of $765.54. No payment
was made for these goods and the suit below was for
the purpose of obtaining that payment (R 240).
During the period prior to July 27, 1949, the
appellant had not qualified to do business in the State
of Utah, but on July 27, 1949, did so (R 240 & 241).
The Court below held that the appellant was entitled
to be paid by the respondents for the materials sold
and delivered after it qualified to do business in the
State of Utah, but was not entitled to be paid for the
goods sold and delivered prior to qualification, for
the reason that the appellant was a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Utah without qualifying so to do and, under the provisions of Section
16-8-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, its contracts
would be void. ( R 242) .
The chemicals involved in this action were manufactured in the United States and several foreign
countries, and packaged by the manufacturer (R 114
& 115). Sodium bicarbonate was packaged in a
multi-wall, special paper bag containing 100 lbs. of
chemicals and sewn shut. Caustic soda was packed
in 400 lb. drums sealed so as to be air-tight because
it solidifies upon contact with air. Tanna-thin was
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packed in n 4·0 lb. multi-wall, sewn bag. Barium
carhouat<' was packed in an 80 lb. multi-wall sewn
bag. Qut·l>racho was packed in a 100 lb. "very
strong" rnulti-wall bag, wired shut and sewn. (See
H 11'5 & 116). It sold at about $27.00 a hundred lbs.
and was packaged in the manner described to avoid
any wastage or loss(R 116). No product handled by
the plaintiff was purchased, imported or sold in a
package containing less than 40 lbs. or more than
400 lbs.

The chemicals were customarily sold by appellant directly to the consumers, who are in most instances, and were in this case, persons drilling oil
wells. Generally the sales and deliveries were made
to the oil well drilling consumers in large loads, i.e.,
loads of such a size that the purchases made by the
defendant here would be considered "small loads"
(R. 131). The purchases involved here were in
quantities varying from 400 lbs. to 25,600 lbs. and
averaging just over 2,500 lbs. each (See Exhibit "B").
Appellant is one of four major mud companies
who control the industry, handling the same products
so far as material and quality is concerned, packed
in the same sized bags, differing only in color, and
sold at virtually the same price by each of thein (R
147). The price varied from day to day (R 124) but
not from company to company.
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The ch~1uicals concerned herein were packaged
by their manufacturers, and shipped in their selfsame packages to Craig, Colorado, where, still in their
original packages, they were trucked by an interstate
common carrier, Watson Truck Lines, across the
Utah state line to Vernal, Utah, (R 114 & 116) where
they were placed on the property of one L. N. Liscombe pending sale and covered with tarpaulins
(R 241).

_.

The appellant had in its employ one S. J. Putman, who was a sales engineer. Mr. Putman took up
residence in Vernal, Utah, in the fall of 1948 for the
purpose of furthering the sales of his employer's products and his duties were to establish customer relations, to sell chemicals and mud, and to supervise
and instruct in the use of those products in the drilling of oil wells. He contacted Baird and Robbins
and a:ryanged to sell them the drilling mud needed
for the drilling of the Bertie Slaugh No. 1 well.
Whenever drilling mud was needed on said well, one
of the tool-pushers or roughnecks went to the Liscombe premises and stacked whatever goods were
needed on his truck. A delivery ticket was made out
either by Mr. Liscombe or Mr. Putman and the goods
were taken to the site of the well where they were
used. The goods were sold in the same packages in
which they had originally been placed by their manufacturer and in which they had been shipped into the
State of Utah and stored at the Liscombe premises.
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None of th~ packages \Vere part of or contained in any
larg<>r pac:kag(' or shipping case and all of the packag<•s W<'n' of appropriate size, material and shape for
direct use from the package by the well-drilling consurners (R 242). The Liscombe property was separately owned by L. N. Liscombe who was paid by the
plaintiff on the basis of the quantity of goods placed
upon his premises and sold therefrom. During the
time material to this action, no products were stored
on or were delivered from the Liscombe premises
excepting the products of the plaintiff ( R 242) .
In every instance, the sale of the drilling mud
and chemicals involved in this action to said Baird
and Robbins was the first sale or use thereof after its
importation into the State of Utah.
It was the contention of the appellant that its

sales -vvere sales in interstate commerce and, as such,
exempt from the provisions of Sections 16-8-1, and
16-8-3 U. C. A., This contention was rejected by
the court below and judgment was entered in appellant's favor for the value of the goods sold after
appellant qualified in Utah, to-wit, $765.54 plus
interest. In its appeal, appellant claims to be
entitled to the judgment awarded and, in addition thereto, a further judgment in the amount of
$7,458.10 plus interest from July 27th, 1949, $7,458.
10 being the price of the goods sold before appellant
qualified to do business in Utah.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

I

Sales of goods in interstate commerce are exempt
from the provisions of Section 16-8-1 and 16-8-3, U.
C. A., 1953.
II

All of the sales concerned in this action are sales
in interstate commerce under the original package
doctrine.
ARGUMENT

Point I

Sales of Goods in Interstate Commerce are
Exempt From the Provisions of Sections
16-8-1 and 16-8-3, U. C. A. 1953.
Section 16-8-1, U. C. A., 1953, requires every
foreign corporation, before doing any business within
Utah, to file with the County Clerk of the County in
which its principal place of business is situated, and
with the Secretary of State, ( 1) copies of its Articles
of Incorporation, Amendments, and By-Laws, duly
certified, (2) an acceptance of the provisions of the
Constitution of Utah and a designation of some person residing in said County as process agent, (3) a
statement setting forth the business it proposes to
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transact in Utah and the amount and proportion of
its stock represeHted by property located or to be
acquired in Utah. Further, the corporation must pay
cPrLain filing fees. Section 16-8-3, U. C. A. 1953,
provides, among other things, that anyone failing to
con1ply with the provisions of Section 16-8-1, supra,
may not maintain any action in any courts of this
state and that every contract, agreement and transaction whatsoever made or entered into by or on
behalf of any such corporation within this state shall
be wholly void on behalf of such corporation.
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the
United States provides as follows:
"The Congress shall have power * * *:
To regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes; * * *."
The respondents contended, and the court below
held, that the provisions of Section 16-8-3, U. C. A.,
1953, barred the appellant from collecting for any
goods sold prior to the time appellant qualified to do
business in Utah. This prevented appellant from
getting judgment for $7,458.10 for which respondents
would otherwise have been held liable. It is the
position of appellant that the court below erred in
this holding for the reason that the sales involved in
this case were sales in interstate commerce and, as
such, exempt from the operation of the statutes requiring qualification to do business.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That sales in interstate commerce are exempt
from the operation of these particular statutes has
been established in the State of Utah by the decision
of this court in the case of Advance-Rumely Thresher
Co. vs. Stohl, 75 Utah 12+, 283 P. 731. We quote from
page 132 of Yol. 75, Utah Reports:
"The transaction involved in this case
being an interstate one, the plaintiff is entitled
to maintain its action notwithstanding it has
never complied with the laws of this state with
respect to foreign corporations doing business
within the state. Sioux Remedy Company vs.
Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. 57, 59 L. Ed.
193."
This case properly followed the clear rule of the
Supreme Court of the United States in a case in which
this precise point was decided. In the case of Sioux
Remedy Co. vs. Cope, cited above by the Utah Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice Van Devanter, it was held that a South
Dakota statute requiring foreign corporations to qualify to do business in South Dakota before bringing
suit to recover the purchase price of goods sold to residents of that state was unconstitutional as a violation of the commerce clause when applied to sales
in interstate commerce. The holding of the Supreme
Court is succinctly digested in the headnotes of thoe
case as follows:
" ( 1 ) The right of a foreign corporation
to demand and enforce payment of goods sold
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in int<>rstate commerce, if not a part of such
con1men:<', i~ so directly connected with it,
and is so essential to its existence and continuann·, that the imposition of unreasonable conditions upon this right must necessarily operate
as a restraint or burden on interstate commPrce.
(2) Interstate commerce is unconstitutionally burdened by the provisions of S. D.
Rev. Codes, 1903, Section 883, 885, under
which, as construed by the highest state court,
the right of a foreign corporatio:q to enforce
payment in a South Dakota court of the purchase price of merchandise which the corporation has lawfully sold within the state in inter:.
state commerce is conditioned upon compliance with the requirements of those sections
that a foreign corporation, before it can sue in
the local courts, must first appoint a resident
agent upon whom process may be served in
any action against it, and must file a copy of
such appointment, and a copy of its charter,
and pay the incidental filing and recording
fees."
In the case of Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 75
L. ed. 478, in a unanimous opinion written by
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes it was held that the statute
of the State of Arkansas requiring every foreign corporation doing business in that state to file a copy
of its charter, duly certified, and a statement of its
assets and liabilities and designate a process agent in
that state under penalty of being unable to make any
enforceable contract in the state of Arkansas, was
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unconstitutional \Yhen applied to sales of goods in
interstate commerce. The reason again \'Vas a conflict \Yith the comm('rce clause of the Constitution
of the United States.
In Yie'Y of the clear holdings of the Supreme
Court of the United States and of the fact that the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah has specifically
followed the ruling of that court, it appears that
there can be no questioning the proposition that, as
applied to sales in interstate commerce, the provisions
of Section 16-8-1 and 16-8-3, U. C. A. 1953, are
unconstitutional and hence void.
Point II

All of the Sales Concerned in the Action are
Sales in Interstate Commerce Under the
Original Package Doctrine.
As pointed out above, sales in interstate comn1erce are exempt from the operation of our statutes
relative to the qualification of a foreign corporation
to do business in the State of Utah. If the sales involved in this action are sales in interstate commerce,
they necessarily partake of that immunity and judgment should be entered for the full amount of the
goods sold and delivered by appellant to respondents.
This would add a judgment for the sum of $7,458.10
plus interest from July 27, 1949, to the judgment
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below. JudgmPnt below was for $765.54 and interest.
All the sales involved in this action were sales
cmnmerce by virtue of the fact that they
\'\'<'n~ sales of goods in the original unbroken packages
in \Yhich they were imported into the state, were sales
by the importer of those goods, and were the first
sales made after the importation.
in

intt~rstate

The original package doctrine is a rule which
states that, so long as goods which have been imported from a foreign country or from a foreign state
remain in the odginal unbroken package in which
they were imported into the state and are unsold,
they are free from control or regulation by the state
into which they were imported, and that this protection extends also to the first sale of those goods. This
doctrine came into the law in the case of Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat 419, 6 L. ed. 678, in an opinion
written by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall.
In. that case Maryland had a statute requiring
"all importers of foreign articles or commodities, of
dry goods, wares or merchandise, by bale or package
* * *" to obtain a license at a cost of $50.00 before
selling the same. Brown imported a package of dry
goods and sold it without obtaining a license. It was
held that, when applied to the sale of goods in the
original package in which imported, the statute was
unconstitutional for the reason that it was repugnant
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to that provision of the constitution of the United
States \Yhic h declares, that "no state shall, without
the consent of Congress~ lay any impost, or duty on
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection laws;" and to
that \Yhich declares that Congress shall have the
po"ver "to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
among the several states and with the Indian tribes."
'Yhen a case came up involving the importing of
goods into a state from a sister state instead of from
a foreign country, the Supreme Court adopted the
_original package doctrine of Brown v. Maryland as
the standard for use in determining when commerce
ended and the control of the commerce clause ceased.
The leading case in this regard is Leisy v. Hardin, 135
U.S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 10 S.C. 681. In that case
122 quarter barrels of beer, 171 one-eighth barrels of
beer and 11 cases of beer were seized by the City
Marshal of Keokuk under a state statute prohibiting
the sale of intoxicating liquors. It was held that the
state could not prohibit the importation of that beer,
from abroad or from a sister state; or, when imported,
prohibit its sale by the importer so long as it remained
in the casks in which it was imported. The holdings
of interest in the present case are summarized by
the Supreme Court in the headnotes as follows:
"1. A citizen of one State has the right to
import be·er into another State, and the right
to sell it there in its original packages.
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2. As to such sale, the State has no power
to intc-rf{·n· by seisure, or any other action, to
pn'v<'nt the importation and sale by a foreign
or non-resident importer.
3. The right of transportation of an article of commerce from one State to another
includes tlze right of the consignee to sell it in
unbroken packages at the place where the
transportation terminates.

4. It is only after the importation is completed and the property imported is mingled
with and becomes a part of the general property of the State by a sale by the importer,
that State regulations can act upon it.
5. The power vested in Congress to regulate commerce among the states cannot be
stopped at the external boundary of a state,
but is capable of authorizing the disposition
within the State of the article imported."
(Italics ours.)
Under the authorities, the application of the
"original package" doctrine has been different in relation to tax cases than in relation to non-tax cases.
The reason for the distinction is the decision that, so
long as any goods partake of the protection and benefits of the laws of a state, they must pay their fair
share of the tax burdens pertaining thereto. So long
as the tax is non-discriminatory, it applies as well to
articles in their original packages as to articles not in
their original packages. This exception, however,
applies only to imports from a sister state and does
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not apply to imports from a foreign country. This
proposition is \Yell stated in the case of City of Winchester vs. Lohrey Packing Company, 237 S.W. 2d,
868, at page 869 as follo\vs:
"The city is correct in its contention that
one engaged in interstate commerce is not
exempt from local taxation. The United States
Supreme Court has said many times, 'interstate
commerce must pay its way', and that it is
not the purpose of the commerce clause, 'torelieve those engaged in interstate commerce of
their just share of state tax burdens, merely
because an incidental or consequential effect
of the tax is an increase in the costs of doing
business'."
For the a hove reason, tax cases do not constitute
authority under the "original package" doctrine
when applied to non-tax situations.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
uniformly held in non-tax cases involving the "original package" doctrine that the freedom from state
regulation furnished by the commerce clause extends
not only to the transportation of the goods into the
state, but also to the sale of those goods by the importer. The reason for this is that, if the State had
the right to regulate the sale of goods imported in
interstate commerce, it would have the right to effectively control that commerce by prohibiting or otherwise limiting the sale of such goods. To control the
sale of goods imported in interstate commerce is to
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<'ffe('t ivdy control the commerce itself, and this

would bP a violation of the commerce clause.
OnP of the leading case~ on this point is Dahnke-

ll 'alkcr J1!illing Company vs. C. T. Bondurant, 257
U. S. 282, 66 L. Ed. 239, 42 S. Ct. 106. This, too, is
a casp involving a statute requiring a foreign corporation to qualify to do business in a state. The plaintiff
was a Tennessee corporation that sent an agent into
Kentucky where he purchased a crop of wheat. The
contract was entered into in the state of Kentucky,
the wheat was pajJ for in the state of Kentucky, was
delivered in the state of Kentucky to railroad cars on
which it was to be shipped to the plaintiff in Tennessee. The defendant failed to deliver the balance
of the vv·heat agreed on under this contract, the plaintiff sued for damages, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the plaintiff was barred from suing
by virtue of its failure to comply with the requirement to qualify to do business in the state of Kentucky. The U. S. Supreme Court reversed that decision, Justice Van Devanter delivering the opinion,
and saying:

"The commerce clause of the Constitution,
Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3, expressly commits to Congress and impliedly withholds from the several
states the power to regulate commerce among
the later. Such commerce is not confined to
transportation from one state to another, but
cornprehends all commercial intercourse between different states and all the component
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parts of that intercourse. Where goods in one
state are transported into another for purposes
of sale, the commerce does not end with the
transportation, but embraces as well the sale
of the goods after they reach their destination,
and \Yhile they are in the original packages.
Brown vs. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446, 447,
6 L. ed. 678, 688, 689; American Steel & Wire
Company vs. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 519 48, L.
ed. 538, 546, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365. On the same
principle, where goods are purchased in one
state for transportation to another, the commerce includes the purchase quite as much as
it does the transportation. American Express
Company vs. Iowa, 196 U.S. 133, 143,49 L. ed.
417, 422, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182. This has been
recognized in many decisions construing the
commerce clause. Thus it was said in Welton
vs. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347, 349:
" 'Commerce' is a term of the largest import.
It comprehends intercourse for the purposes of
trade in any and all its forms, including the
transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange
of commodities.,-, In Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U.
S. 1, 220, 32 L. ed. 346, 350, 2 Inters. Com.
Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6, it was tersely said:
"Buying and selling and the transportation
incidental thereto constitute commerce." In
United States vs. E. C. Knight Company, 156
U. S. 1, 13, 39 L. ed. 325, 329, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.
249, "contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods
to be transported among the several states"
were declared "part of the interstate trade or
commerce." And in Addyston Pipe & Steel
Company vs. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 241,
44 L. ed. 136, 147, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96, the
Court referred to the prior decisio:ps as esta bSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lishing that "interstate commerce consists of
inh'JToursp and traffic between the citizens or
illhabitaJits of different states, and includes not
only the transportation of persons and property and the navigation of public waters for
that purpose, but also the purchase, sale, and
exchange of commodities." In no case has the
Court made any distinction between buying
and selling, or between buying for transportation to another state and transporting for
sale in another state. Quite to the contrary,
the import of the decisions has been that if the
transportation was incidental to buying or
selling, it was not material whether it came
first or last.
"A corporation of one state may go into
another, without obtaining the leave or license
of the latter, for all the legitmate purposes of
such commerce; and any statute of the latter
state which obstructs or lays a burden on the
exercise of this privilege is void under the commerce clause. Crutcher vs. Kentucky, 141 U. S.
47, 57, 35 L. ed. 649, 652, Sup. Ct. Rep. 851;
lVestern Union Telegraph Company vs. Kansas, 26 U.S. 1, 27, 54 L. ed. 355, 366, 30 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 190; International Textbook Company
vs. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 112, 54 L. ed. 678, 687,
27 L. R. A. CN.S.) 493, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481, 18
Ann. Cas. 1103; Sioux Remedy Co. vs. Cope,
235 U.S. 197, 59 L. ed. 193, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep.
57. * * *
"For these reasons, we are of the opinion
that the transaction was a part of interstate
commerce, in which the plaintiff lawfully
could engage without any permission from the
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state of Kentucky, and that the statute in question, '"hich concededly imposed burdensome
conditions, was, as to that transaction, invalid
because repugnant to the commerce clause."
The doctrine of the Bondurant case above is affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the most recent decision of that court relating directly
to the original package doctrine. That case is Wallace
vs. Currin, 95 Fed. 2d 856, affirmed 58 S. C. 3 79;
306 U.S. 1, 83 L. ed. 441. See particularly the quotation of the Circuit Court in 95 Fed. 2d, at page 862,
setting forth the above rule verbatim.
A case very similar to the case at bar is Talbot
vs. Smith, et al, 277 S. W. 25 7. In that case the goods
concerned were aluminum sets which were in their
original package, and were at rest in the State of
Kentucky, awaiting sale. Thereafter they were sold,
still in their original packages, by agents of the
plaintiff company, under a contract with a local
merchant who guaranteed payment for the sets.
When the plaintiff company sought to collect from
the local merchant, the merchant pleaded that the
plaintiff had failed to file a certificate of doing business under an assumed name, and thus was barred
from recovery. The plaintiff pleaded that it was,
in making and carrying out the contracts of sale, engaged in interstate commerce.
The court held for the plaintiff, saying:
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"In a case like this, the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States are controlling. The rule adopted by that court is
that, where goods in one state are transported
into another for purposes of sale, the commerce
does not end with the transportation, but embraces as well the sale of the goods after they
reach their destination, while they are in the
original packages. In applying this rule, no
distinction is made between buying and selling, or between buying for transportation to
another state and transporting for sale in another state. On the contrary, the rule is that,
if the transportation is incidental to the buying
or selling, it is immaterial whether it comes
first or last. Dahnke-Walker Milling Company
vs. Bondurant. The evidence discloses that
the goods were shipped from another state in
fulfillment of a contract which appellant made
with appellees, and for the purpose of sale in
this state in accordance with terms of the contract. Soon after the goods reached Bowling
Green, and while they were in the original
packages, they were sold and delivered to purchasers pursuant to orders taken by the crew
of salesmen. In other words, the case is one
where the goods were transported for the purpose of sale, and the sales were made after the
goods reached their destination, and while
they were in the original packages. That being true, the entire transaction was one of interstate commerce. It follows that Section
199 b1, Kentucky Statutes, is inoperative. * * *"
The most recent original package case cited in
the digests is Pace Manufacturing Company vs. Milliken, 70 F. Supp. 740. In that case the sheriff seized
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a shipment of 25 slot machines while in their original
packages. They \Yen~ held to be in interstate commerce and free from state regulation, even police regulation because "at~ the time of seizure the goods
were in the original unbroken packages in possession
of the Railway Express Agency."
The rule is again stated by the Supreme Court
In the case of Department of Public Utilities vs.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company, 108 S.W. 2d 586,
194 Ark. 354, aff. 58 S. Ct. 770, 304 U. S. 61, 82 L.
ed. 1149, as follows:
"The general rule is that as long as an
article imported remains in the hands of an
importer in the original and unbroken package
in which it is imported, it is protected by the
commerce clause of the Constitution from interference of state laws, and that it is only
when the original package has been sold by
the importer * * * * that it becomes subject
to state legislation."

Are the goods in the principal case in
their "original packages" within the meaning
of the doctrine?
In the argument below counsel for the respondent argued, and the court appeared to rule in favor of,
the following propositions:

.._
I

I

1. That a package which is sold to the ultimate
consumer and is of a size suitable for use by such
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ultimate consumer is not an original package within
the Ineaning of the doctrine.
2. That a package which is sold at retail by the
in1portPr cannot be an original package within the
meaning of the doctrine, for the doctrine is restricted
solely to sales to wholesalers by the persons importing
them into this state.
3. That only packages consisting of an aggregate of smaller packages are within the scope of the
meaning of the phrase "original package," and that,
therefore, a package filled with a substance which is
the same throughout and is not divided into smaller
packages is not within the scope of the doctrine.
These propositions have been fought out with
some bitterness by the Supreme Court of the United
States in a series of cases beginning with Schollenberger vs. Pennsylvania, 18 S. C. 757, 171 U. S. 1,
43 L. ed. 49, continuing through Austin vs. Tennessee,
21 S.C. 132,179 U.S. 343, 45 L. ed. 244, Cook vs.
Marshall County, 25 S.C. 233, 96 U. S. 261, 49 L. ed.
471 and concluded in Kirmeyer vs. Kansas, 35 S. C.
419,236 U.S. 568, 58 L. ed. 721. The Schollenberger
case, the Austin case and the Cook case all contain
long discussions of the original package doctrine and
the size and type of packages to which it applies.
In the Schollenberger case it was held that a 10
lb. tub of oleomargarine and a 40 lb. tub of oleomarSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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garine sold to the ultimate consumf'r by one who had
imported them from a sistf'r state were original packages \Yithin the meaning of the doctrine and as such
\Yere protected from the provisions of a statute prohibiting the sale of oleomargarine. This case clearly
shows that no distinction is to be made between sales
at retail and \Yholesale, sales to the ultimate consumer
and not to the ultimate consumer, and sales of goods
\Yhich are the same throughout the entire package
and those \Yhich are divided into smaller packages
contained in a larger snipping package. In this case
the entire Supreme Court was in accord as to what
constituted an original package but there was a dissent by Mr. Justice Gray and Mr. Justice Harlan on
the question of whether oleomargarine was a deleterious substance and subject to being excluded from
a state by state law under the police powers. Of
particular note is the following language at page 56
of vol. 49, L. ed.:
"The question is whether a package intended and used for the supply of the retail
trade is an 'original package' within the protection of the interstate commerce cases. * * *
At page 58 the court continues:
"We are not aware of any such distinction
as is attempted to be made by the court below
in these cases between a sale at wholesale to
individuals engaged in the wholesale trade or
one at retail to the consumer. How small may
be an original package it is not necessary to
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hPn' detern1ine. We do say that a sale of a
10 pound package of oleomargarine, manufactured, packed, marked, imported and sold undPr the circumstances set forth in detail in
thP special verdict, was a valid sale, although
to a pt·rson who was himself a consumer. We
do not say or intimate that this right of sale
extended beyond the first sale by the importer
after its arrival within this State. * * *
"The importer had the right to sell, not
only personally, but he had the right to employ an agent to sell for him. Otherwise, his
right to sell would be substantially valueless,
for it cannot be supposed that he would be
personally engaged in the sale of every original package sent to the different states in the
union. Having the right to sell through his
agent, a sale thus effected is valid.
"The right of the importer to sell cannot
depend upon whether the original package is
suitable for retail trade or not. His right to sell
is the same, whether to consumers or to wholesale dealers in the article, provided he sells
them in original packages."
It should be noted that the special findings
referrrd to in this case (49 L. ed. at page 56) were:
"That the package in which the oleomargarine was sold * * * was of such form, size,
and weight as is used by producers or shippers
for the purpose of securing both the convenience in handling and security in transportation of merchandise between dealers in the
ordinary course of actual commerce and the
said form, size, and weight were adopted in
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good faith, and not for the purpose of evading
the la\YS of the common\Yealth of Pennsylvania,
said package being one of a number of similar
packages forming one consignment shipped
by the said company to the said defendant."
Some t\YO years later in the case of Austin vs.
Tennessee, supra, the exact same Justices were called
upon to decide \IYhether the protection of th commerce clause under the original package doctrine
should be extended to small packages containing ten
cigarettes which were stacked by the manufacturer
on warehouse floor, picked up by the express company in baskets, carried in those baskets to the purchaser and dumped out at the purchaser's place of
business by the express company in contravention
of a Tennessee statute providing that no one could
bring cigarettes into the state for the purpose of
selling, giving away or otherwise disposing of them.
The two holdings of importance in this latter
case were, first, that a prohibition against the importation of cigarettes is a legitimate exercise of
police powers by a state, and, second, that small
paper packages of cigarettes, three inches in length
and one and one-half inches in width containing
ten cigarettes were not original packages within
the meaning of the doctrine and within its protection from interference by state laws, but, if
there was any original package, it was the basket
in which they were transported. On both these
questions there was a serious split in the Court,
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the n1ajority opnuon being written by Mr. Justice
Brown and concurn•d in by three other Justices, Mr.
Justin• \Vhite concurring specially, and the Chief
.Jus lin· and t lin'<' other Justices dissenting in a long
and spirited diss<>nt. The first holding is not germane
to th(• cas<> before us at this time and we shall refer
only to thosP portions of the case dealing with the
sC'cond proposition. After a review of the history of
the original package doctrine, the majority opinion
summarized its holdings as follows, on pages 232
and 233, Vol. 45, L. ed.:
"The real question in this case is whether
the size of the package in which the importation as actually made is to govern, or the size
of the package in which bona fide transactions
are carried on between the manufacturer and
the wholesale dealer residing in different
states. "\Ve hold to the latter view. The whole
theory of the exemption of the original package from the operation of state laws is based
upon the idea that the property is imported in
the ordinary form in which, from time immemorial, foreign goods have been brought
into the country. These have gone at once
into the hands of the wholesale dealers, who
have been in the habit of breaking the packages and distributing their contents among
the several retail dealers throughout the state.
It was with reference to this method of doing
business that the doctrine of the exemption of
the original package grew up. By taking the
words 'original package' in their literal sense,
a number of so-called original package manufactories have been started through the counSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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try, \Yhose business it is to manufacture goods
for the exprt:'ss purpose of sending their products into other states in minute packages, that
may at once go into the hands of the retail
dealers and consumers, and thus bid defiance
to the la\YS of the state against their importation and sale. In all the cases which have
heretofore arisen in this court the packages
\Yere of such size as to exclude the idea that
they were to go directly into the hands of the
consumer, or be used to evade the police regulations of the state with regard to the particular article. No doubt the fact that cigarettes
are actually imported in a certain package is
strong evidence that they are original packages
within the meaning of the law; but this presumption attaches only when the importation
is made in the usual manner prevalent among
honest dealers, and a bona fide package of a
particular size. Without undertaking to determine what is the proper size of an original
package in each case, evidently the doctrine
has no application where the manufacturer
puts up the package with the express intent of
evading the laws of another state, and is enabled to carry out his purpose by the facile
agency of an express company and the connivance of his consignee. This court has repeatedly held that, so far from lending its
authority to frauds upon the sanitary laws of
the several state, we are bound to respect such
laws and to aid in their enforcement, so far
as can be done without infringing upon the
constitutional rights of the parties.* * * (Italics
ours).
"There could hardly be stronger evidence
of fraud than is shown by the facts of this case,
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which we quote from the opinion of the court:
'The defendant purchased from the American Tobacco Company, at its factory, in Durham, North Carolina, a lot of cigarettes manufactured by that company at that factory, and
then~ by it put into pasteboard boxes, in quantities of ten cigarettes to each box; that each
of these boxes, known as packages, was separately stamped and labeled, as prescribed by
the United States revenue statute; that after
defendant's purchase the American Tobacco
Company piled upon the floor of its warehouse
in Durham, North Carolina, the number of
boxes or packages sold, and, having done so,
notified the Southern Express Company to
come and get them, and said company, by its
agent, took them from the floor and placed
them in an open basket already and previously
in the possession of the Southern Express Company, and in that basket had them transported
by express to the defendant's place of business
and lifted from it on to the counter of the
defendant the lot of detached boxes or packages
of cigarettes, and thereupon took a receipt and
departed with the empty basket. Thereafter
the defendant sold one of these boxes or packages without breaking it, and for that sale he
stands convicted.'
"And yet we are told that each one of
these packages is an original package, and entitled to the protection of the Constitution of
the United States as a separate and distinct
importation. We can only look upon it as a
discreditable subterfuge to which this court
ought not to lend its countenance. If there be
any original package at all in this case we
think it is the basket, and not the paper box."
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l\Ir. Justice 'Yhite~ whose position determined
the matter in a court other\lvise split four to four,
concurring said:
··I do not understand that anything in the
opinion of the court impairs the doctrine protecting original packages from interference
by the police or any other power of the state,
as announced by so many opinions of this
court, especially as expounded in Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters.
Con1. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681, and Rhodes
v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 42 L. ed. 1088, 18 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 664, and the authorities which are
cited in the opinions of the court in both of
these cases. If I thought either the opinion
of the court just announced or the conclusion
which it reaches had the effect of weakening
the doctrine upheld by the authorities to which
I had just referred, I should be unable to concur. Indeed, as I understand the case as now
decided, all the questions adverted to are
merged in the solution of the one decisive issue,
which is, Was each particular parcel of cigarettes an original package vvithin the constitutional import of those words as defined by
the previous adjudications of the court? I am
constrained to conclude that this question is
correctly answered in the negative, not only
from the size of each particular parcel, but
from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, among which may be mentioned the
trifling value of each parcel, the absence of an
address on each, and the fact that many parcels for the purpose of commercial shipment,
were aggregated, thrown into and carried in
an open basket. Thus associated in their shipSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Inent, they could not, under all the facts and
c ircutnstancPs of the case, after arrival be
s<'~regat(•d so as to cause each to become an
original package."
In the dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice
Br<'\\'<'r and concurred in by the Chief Justice, Mr.
Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice Peckham appears the
following language:
"Recently in Schollenberger vs. Pennsylz·ania, supra, \Ye held that an importer had a
right to import oleomargarine in 10 pound
packages, and sell it in such a package at retail
to a consumer. Apparently the dividing line
as to the size of packages must be somewhere
between that of a 10 pound package of oleomargarine and that of a package of ten cigarettes; but where? Must diamonds, in order to
be within the protecting power of the nation,
be carried from state to state in 10 pound packages?"
Because of the conflict and the split in the Court,
the particular cigarette company involved commenced to ship its small boxes of cigarettes loose,
that is, the packages of ten cigarettes each were piled
on the floor of the warehouse, were picked up by the
express company by shovelling them into some sort
of wagon or carrier, placing them in the express car
loose and delivering them in the same manner. The
question of whether that placed them within the
original package doctrine came up for decision and
was decided some five years later by a court composed
of the same Chief Justice, six of the same Associate
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Justices and Justices Oliver \Vendell Holmes and
'Villiam R. Day, in the case of Cook v. Marshall
County, supra. There the Court reaffirmed the proposition that their holding in the Austin case was
based on the fact that the method of shipping
'vas merely a convenient subterfuge for evading the
la'v forbidding the sale of cigarettes within the State,
\Yas fraudulent in its purpose and procedure, and was
not a usual method of interstate shipment." The
following language of the majority opinion found in
49 L. ed. at pages 474-475, is significant:
"The term 'original package' is not defined by any statute and is simply a convenient form of expression adopted by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland. to indicate that a license tax could not be exacted of
an importer of goods from a foreign country
who disposes of such goods in the form in
which they were imported. It is not denied
that, in the changed and changing conditions
of commerce between the states, packages in
which these shipments may be made from one
state to another may be smaller than those
'bales, hogsheads, barrels, or tierces,' to which
the term was originally applied by Chief Justice Marshall, but whatever the form or size
employed, there must be a recognition of the
fact that the transaction is a bona fide one, and
that the usual methods of interstate shipment
have not been departed from for the purpose
of evading the police laws of the states. (Italics
ours.)
"In Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L.
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<'d. 128, 3 Int<'rs. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.
G81, quarl<'r barrels, and even one-eighth barrPls and cases of beer, were recognized as
original packages or kegs, though the size of
sue h packages and the usual methods of transporting bePr do not seem to have been made the
subject of discussion. T~ere is nothing in the
opinion to indicate that it was not legitimate
to ship beer in kegs of this size. So, too, in
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, oleomargarine transported and sold in packages of 10
pounds weight was recognized as bona fide,
but it was expressly found by the jury in that
case that the package was an original package,
as required by the act of Congress, and was of
such 'form, size, and weight as is used by producers or shippers for the purpose of securing
both convenience in handling and security in
transportation of merchandise between dealers
in the ordinary course of actual commerce,
and the said form, size, and weight were
adopted in good faith, and not for the purpose
of evading the laws of the commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, said package being one of a
number of similar packages forming one consignment, shipped by the said company to the
said defendant.' While it may be impossible
to define the size or shape of an original package, the principle upon which the doctrine is
founded would not justify us in holding that
any package which could not be commercially
transported from one state to another as a
separate importation could be considered as
an original pacakage."
In that case, Mr. Justice White affirmed his
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concurrence and the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brewer
and l\llr. Jnstic Peckham dissented.

This case clearly established as the test the
questions:
1. Is the transaction a bona fide one? and
2. Have the usual methods of interstate shipment been departed from for the purpose of evading
the police laws of the state?

Ten years later, before a court cons1st1ng of
Chief Justice White, Justices McKenna, Holmes, and
Day, as the only remaining Justices of the court
which decided the Cook case, there arose in the case
of Kirmeyer vs. Kansas, supra, the question of whether
a dealer in intoxicating liquor who had his warehouse
at Stillings, Missouri, just across the river from
Leavenv1orth, Kansas, and sold liquor to the "family
trade" for private use via J:ail and telephone orders
by setting aside cases, kegs or casks in his warehouse
in Stillings, tagging them with the names of the
purchasers and sending them daily over the bridge
in his own wagons to the residences of the purchasers
in Leavenworth, Kansas, was protected from interference in his occupation by the original package
doctrine. It was held that he was so protected even
though his trade was a retail trade and, even though
a barrel or a cask of liquor or beer contains goods
which are the same throughout and are not broken
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up into smaller packages. In the following language
of the court is of substantial interest:
"Improper application was given to what
was said in Austin vs. Tennessee and Cook vs.
1\larshall County, supra. The point for decision
in th~m was whether the packages containing
cig.arettes shipped into the state were 'original'
ones within the constitutional import of the
term, as theretofore defined. Looking at all
tlw circumstances this court concluded they
were not. The general use of like packages
was unknown and impractical in transactions
between manufacturers and wholesale dealers
residing in different states, and the plan pursued was plainly a mere device designed to
defeat the policy of the state where the goods
were received,-not a bona fide commercial
arrangement. Here no such question is presented."
What then is the result when these rules and
distinctions laid down by the highest court of the
land are applied to the case now before us? In the
principal case there is no evidence whatever of any
fraudulent purpose, intent or design on the part of
appellant. Respondents have never contended that
the transaction was not bona fide or that the method
of shipping adopted by appellant was designed to
evade regulations passed under the police powers of
the state. Surely no one believes that the importation of oil well drilling chemicals into this state endangers the health, welfare or morals of our citizens.
These importations are beneficial, making possible
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the development of our great oil reserves. This
leaves us then \Yith a question of whether the packages used here are such packages as are ordinarily
used in the trade, i.e., vYhether they are packages
comparable to the packages of cigarettes or to the
10 lb. tub of oleomargarine~
According to the testimony of Mr. Putman (R
147), four major mud companies generally control
the industry and all handle the same products so far
as material and quality is concerned and in all
instances each chemical is packed in the same size
bags or casks, differing as between companies only
in color. Further, those packages are packaged "all
over the world" by their manufacturers in the same
packages in which they were imported into this
state and sold (R 114 & 115). These facts clearly
show that the packages concerned in this case are
the usual packages in the trade, are packages as
they are packaged pursuant to a bona fide commercial arrangement and in accordance with the
manner in which this particular kind of goods
have been and still are brought into this country from
foreign countries and into this state from both foreign
countries and foreign states.
That one of the important chemicals involved
is ruinec.l if it comes into contact with air, is packed
in drums which are air tight, and contain 400 lbs.
of material appears to us to demonstrate conclusively
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that the method of packaging was adopted ·to safeguard the chemical during its transportation so that
no break would accur in the airtight seal required for
it to remain in a usuable state. That this package is
used by the ultimate consumer results not from any
intention to design it for use in a retail trade, rather
it results from the fact that the ultimate consumers
in this instance use the product involved herein in
tremendous quantities, in such quantities in fact
that a 400 lb. drum is a convenient and usable unit.
The strong bags in which the other chemicals are
packed, the fact that some of them are sewed up with
wire bands so as to avoid any loss of their expensive
contents, further illustrates the proposition that these
packages are designed for safety and convenience in
transportation. To have them be of a size that is
convenient for use by a single man at the well
drilling site is an incidental, though desirable, fea
ture. The Schollenberger case, supra, and the Kirmeyer case, supra, conclusively established that the
fact that a package is usable by the ultimate consumer
in the form in which it is imported does not per se
take that package outside the scope of the original
package doctrine.

' 1

4

Of additional importance is the fact that the
chemicals involved in this case are generally purchased by the ultimate consumer from the importer
in lots of more than a ton. (See statement on page 4,
supra, and Exhibit "B".) It is more in the nature of
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an industrial trade than what we generally consider
to be retail trade.
In light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Schollenberger, Austin, Cook, and Kirmeyer cases, supra, the
goods imported and sold by appellant to respondents
were clearly in their "original packages" within the
meaning of the doctrine that establishes that, until sold
or broken, they are protected under the commerce
clause from regulation or control by the individual
states.
Counsel for respondents suggested below that
the original package doctrine is no longer the law.
This proposition is refuted by the holding in Pace
Manufacturing Co. vs. Milliken, supra, a recent case.
That it was still a living doctrine in April of 1948 is
pointed out by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Commonwealth vs. Bayuk Cigars, 359 Pa. 202; 58 A.
2d 445, 447 as follows:
"Both grounds of constitutional invalidity,
so reckoned with by the learned court below,
fundamentally stem from the fictional situation legally supplied by the 'original package'
idea, first developed by Chief Justice Marshall
in Brown v. Maryland, 1827, 12 Wheat U. S.
419, 6 L. ed. 678, and ever since scrupulously

observed by the courts of this country. * * *"
(Italics ours) .
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CONCLUSION

For the reason that the statute requ1nng the
appellant foreign corporation to qualify to do business
in Utah is repugnant to the commerce clause of the
Constitution of the United States when applied to
transactions in commerce between the states, and
that, under the original package doctrine, all the sales
concerned herein are sales of goods still in commerce
between the states, appellant respectfully requests
this honorable court to modify the judgment entered
below by adding to it the sum of $7,458.10, with
interest at the rate of 6 per cent per year from July
27, 1949, to date, and costs of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
Skeen, Thurman, Worsley
& Snow, Verl C. Ritchie, and

Earl D. Tanner.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

